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Abstract
Firms are facing progressively more stringent tax disclosure requirements. In
this paper, we examine whether increased qualitative tax transparency leads to in-
tended outcomes using, as an exogenous shock, the 2016 UK reform that mandated
the disclosure of a tax strategy for firms above a certain size threshold. We find that
firms that have to publish a separate tax strategy report significantly increase their
voluntary tax disclosure in the annual reports, but we show no widespread effect on
tax avoidance, measured by changes in effective tax rates. We document two mech-
anisms through which mandating a tax strategy report affects overall tax disclo-
sure. First, we find large changes in disclosure for firms facing high public scrutiny.
Second, firms with higher quality of tax strategy reports increase the qualitative
discussion of their tax affairs in their annual reports by larger amounts, while firms
with lower quality reports show increases in tax avoidance. Our results demonstrate
the difficulty of generating a standard that effectively incentivizes desirable behavior
when the disclosure mandate is asking for purely qualitative information.
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1 Introduction
Information accessibility is a fundamental component to achieve efficient resource allo-
cation and, thus, economic growth. Therefore, information disclosure regulations are
increasingly used to promote desirable behavior complementing the regulations that ex-
plicitly prohibit undesirable behavior, e.g., in areas such as product quality, environmental
policy, and taxation (see Leuz and Wysocki, 2016; Grewal and Serafeim, 2020). In this
paper, we evaluate a qualitative tax disclosure mandate aimed at increasing tax trans-
parency and reducing tax avoidance. By this, we contribute to a better understanding of
how useful disclosure mandates are as regulations to promote desirable behavior. While
there is already a growing literature on the effects of quantitative tax disclosures, we know
little about the effects of qualitative tax disclosures. However, these types of disclosure
mandates are becoming increasingly popular. Since the characteristics of qualitative dis-
closure differ fundamentally from quantitative disclosure, it is crucial to understand their
effectiveness as an additional tool available to regulators.
For a decade now, there has been a major push towards increasing tax transparency,
as these measures are considered one of the most important policy tools to reduce tax
avoidance and to raise revenues (see OECD Tax Transparency forum, 2020). In general,
previous literature identifies three channels through which tax transparency initiatives
can reduce tax avoidance by firms (Müller et al. (2020)). First, disclosed information can
be used by tax authorities in firm audits; second, it can help to detect loopholes in tax
law and, thus, improve the current tax system; and, third, in case of public disclosure,
increased public pressure can induce changes in firm behavior. The empirical evidence
from examining the disclosure of additional quantitative tax information suggests that
requiring firms to disclose additional tax figures in financial statements (e.g., unrecognized
tax benefits under FIN48) can represent an effective tool to reduce tax avoidance (Hope
et al., 2013, Gupta et al., 2014, Henry et al., 2016) and provide valuable information
to tax authorities (Bozanic et al. (2017)). Further, while making disaggregated data at
the country level available to the general public can trigger voluntary disclosure (Kays
(2020)), it has a limited effect on profit shifting behavior (Hoopes et al., 2018; Joshi et al.,
2020).
In this paper, we study the effects of a disclosure mandate which required firms to
provide purely qualitative information. We focus on the introduction of mandatory tax
strategy reporting in 2016 in the UK, which has the goal of curbing tax avoidance and
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increasing the availability of tax information to the general public.1 This regulatory
change forced a group of UK firms to publish a report discussing the firm’s tax strategy
with respect to firm-level tax risk governance, attitude towards tax planning, and the
relationship with the local tax authority, Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC).
The mandated tax strategy report must be easily accessible but can be a standalone
report or may be integrated in another report, e.g., the annual report. The HMRC
guidelines explicitly state the possibility to avoid any numerical disclosure, making this
regulatory change the perfect setting to investigate the effect of mandating a qualitative
tax disclosure.
Additionally, the tax strategy disclosure regulation was introduced in a setting where
many firms were already voluntarily discussing their tax strategy in their annual reports.
We take advantage of this feature to study how firms’ mandatory disclosure decisions
interact with firms’ voluntary disclosure choices. Further, similar to the corporate social
responsibility disclosures (see Grewal and Serafeim (2020))2, our setting enables us to
study managers’ decision on the choice between two disclosure methods: the tax strategy
report (standalone report) and the annual report.
Our analysis proceeds in two steps; First, we provide descriptive evidence on the
newly-introduced tax strategy disclosure, where we discuss examples of tax strategy re-
ports and their quality. Then, we show trends and descriptive statistics on tax strategy
disclosure patterns in firms’ annual reports. Second, using regression analysis, we inves-
tigate whether and how the mandate affected firms’ tax strategy disclosure in the annual
reports and their tax avoidance behavior. We focus on the disclosure effects in annual
reports because it is not clear how salient a new disclosure channel, such as a separate tax
strategy report, is to stakeholders on its own. In contrast, annual reports are subject to
more attention and constitute a very important firm disclosure outlet (e.g., Hope (2003)).
For the analysis of annual report disclosures, we build a novel text-based measure of quali-
tative tax disclosure by, first, manually classifying sentences describing firms’ tax strategy
from a representative sub-sample of annual reports. We then use a näıve Bayes machine
learning approach to classify sentences as tax strategy sentences or non-tax strategy sen-
tences in all annual reports in our sample. We proxy for firms’ tax avoidance by Cash
and Book ETRs.
To provide causal evidence, we use difference-in-difference methodology to compare
1For more details, see Schedule 19 of the Finance Act 2016, https://www.gov.uk/guidance/large-
businesses-publish-your-tax-strategy.
2We consider the tax strategy disclosure mandate to be in many respects similar to a corporate
social responsibility type disclosure. Indeed, the Global Sustainability Standards Board has recently
recommended to incorporate a discussion of a firm’s tax strategy in its corporate social responsibil-
ity report, see https://www.globalreporting.org/information/news-and-press-center/Pages/First-global-
standard-for-tax-transparency.aspx.
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UK firms affected by the reform, i.e., those with turnover exceeding GBP 200m and/or
the balance sheet total exceeding GBP 2bn, and those unaffected, before and after the
reform. To focus exclusively on the effects of qualitative tax disclosure on firms, we
exclude the very large firms that fall under the quantitative Country by Country (CbC)
reporting requirements, which were introduced around the same time. Hence, our treated
sample includes only firms above the mandatory qualitative threshold and below the CbC
reporting threshold. Our control group includes firms below the qualitative threshold,
which are most comparable to the treatment group. For this purpose, we exclude small and
medium-sized firms (SMEs). Our final sample includes 225 firms and 2,104 observations
over the period 2010-2019.
It is not clear ex-ante whether we can expect an effect of a qualitative tax disclosure
regulation on firm behavior. This is because qualitative disclosures differ fundamentally
from quantitative disclosures. For example, qualitative disclosure may include more nu-
anced information and may be better suited to provide information to less sophisticated
stakeholders (e.g., customers, employees, civil society). Nevertheless, qualitative disclo-
sures risk being boilerplate, and, therefore, effective qualitative disclosures are hard to
formulate (e.g., Christensen et al., 2019, Dyer et al., 2017). However, even ineffective
qualitative disclosure mandates can impose substantial additional costs on firms. To ad-
dress these issues, in additional analyses, we examine the heterogeneity of our results
as a function of the degree of public attention paid to firms (as measured by media
attention and business to consumer, B2C, industries), firm characteristics (voluntary dis-
closure, level of tax avoidance and percentage of board members with a tax/accounting
background) and the quality of firms’ tax strategy report disclosure (length, specificity,
similarity, and compliance).
The qualitative disclosures on tax strategies that we study are geared towards a broad
range of stakeholders, in particular, the general public. Specifically, the intend of the
policymaker was to force large firms to provide insights into their tax-related practices
to discourage aggressive tax planning via increased public attention on tax practices of
corporations (HMRC (2015), Point 1.18.). Public attention changed disclosure decisions
in the UK with regard to quantitative disclosures before (Dyreng et al. (2016)), and,
therefore, our hypothesis is that it could also have an effect in case of qualitative disclosure
(see also the survey by Graham et al. (2014)). From prior studies we know that new, or
more disseminated, information about the reporting firm allows activists and consumers
to shame firms to change their behavior (e.g., Christensen et al. (2017); Dyreng et al.
(2016); Rauter (2020); Hoopes et al. (2018); Christensen et al. (2019)).
We expect this to be the case, even in a context where firms already disclose their
tax strategy voluntarily prior to the reform. As shown by Grewal (2021) in the context
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of quantitative disclosures, mandatory disclosure requirements affect firms that already
comply with the disclosure requirement pre-reform and induce them to decrease their
green house gas emissions even further. There are two channels through which such a
behavioral change may occur: first, mandated disclosure reduces information processing
costs for stakeholders by providing a benchmark (Healy and Palepu (2001); Maines and
McDaniel (2000), Grewal (2021)). Regulation could, therefore, increase the use of and
the attention to disclosures by stakeholders, resulting in additional pressure on voluntary-
disclosing firms to change behavior after mandated reporting. Second, the introduction
of new disclosure regulation may increase managers’ fears of further regulatory actions
(Grewal (2021)).
However, in order for public pressure to influence firm behavior, disclosure needs to
impose additional costs for the firm. This may not be the case in our setting for two rea-
sons. First, because of its qualitative nature, the disclosure mandated by the UK reform
is potentially less actionable (Cao et al. (2018)). Qualitative disclosure often does allow
more boilerplate and non-specific disclosure (Hope et al. (2016)), which in turn does not
allow stakeholders to exert pressure on companies to change real activity (Christensen
et al. (2019)). Second, the UK regulation may not be tight enough: in principle, man-
dated qualitative disclosures may increase the informativeness of previously voluntary
disclosures by providing benchmarks against which users of the disclosed information can
judge the disclosures (Christensen et al. (2019)). Yet, the law explicitly invites affected
firms to go beyond what is strictly demanded and to exclude sensitive information. This
means that the definition of each category becomes very broad and might not function as
a bench-marking tool.
Consistent with these arguments, we find that the mandate to publicly discuss the tax
strategy only partially affected firm behavior relative to what policymakers intended. We
show that firms comply with the disclosure requirement3, but they do not reduce their
tax avoidance. When examining the quality of the tax strategy reports, we document
variation in terms of the length of the report and the level of boilerplate and specificity of
the mandated disclosure. We show that firms’ discussion of their tax strategy increased
on average: treated firms in our sample tend to go beyond what is required by the law
by providing both a separate tax strategy report and increasing tax strategy disclosure in
their annual reports. The heterogeneity analysis reveals that firms that were previously
subject to low public attention, firms that provided disclosure voluntarily before the
reform, and firms with higher quality of their tax strategy reports increase their tax
strategy disclosure in their annual reports more relative to control firms in the same
groups. The public pressure channel plays an important role in the amount of voluntary
3Firms in our sample largely comply, and even non-UK affected firms did, see Belnap (2019b).
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tax strategy disclosure provided in annual reports. Firms subject to public attention have
high levels of tax strategy disclosure before the reform already, and the new disclosure
requirement forces firms that were previously subject to low public scrutiny to increase
their tax strategy disclosure substantially.
The heterogeneity analysis provides no evidence of reductions in firm tax avoidance,
even for those firms that increase qualitative tax strategy disclosure the most, those that
are subject to larger public scrutiny, or those that showed more tax avoidance prior to the
reform. However, we find evidence that providing lower quality disclosures in response to
the mandate is related to decreased Cash ETRs. This suggests an important interplay
between the quality of qualitative disclosure and firm tax avoidance. Therefore mandating
the publication of a tax strategy report may not generate the kind of actionable disclosure
that allows stakeholders to pressure firms into changing their tax avoidance behavior.
Instead, the descriptive evidence and heterogeneity analysis suggest that firms use the tax
strategy disclosure in annual reports to portray themselves as ”good tax citizens”. Firms
mostly comply or even over-comply in their disclosure. The compliance in the letter of the
law but not in the spirit that we observe in response to this qualitative disclosure mandate
may lead to undesirable effects. At the extreme, it may reduce the informativeness of firms’
annual report disclosure to its readers by increasing non-informative disclosures while at
the same time imposing opportunity costs on managers (Christensen et al. (2019)).
Our study contributes to three streams of literature. First, we complement the lit-
erature on corporate disclosure regulation. We show the effects of mandated qualitative
tax disclosure on firm behavior and on voluntary disclosure. While firms are compliant,
and some firms are even over-compliant in their disclosure, they provide disclosure that
is potentially uninformative and does not change firm behavior. Earlier literature shows
already that boilerplate disclosure may be used by firms strategically to dilute the in-
formativeness of mandated qualitative disclosures. Consistent with this argument, Dyer
et al. (2017) demonstrate by means of large-scale textual analysis of US financial reports
that firms regularly respond to new disclosure requirements in annual reports by extend-
ing their unspecific and boilerplate disclosure in these documents. We take their analysis
to a specific regulatory setting, in which firms have the choice of where to disclose the
mandated information, to investigate how the mandate affected firms’ behavior and their
voluntary disclosure choices in the annual reports. We show that in our setting, firms
also increase their overall qualitative tax disclosure beyond what is strictly mandatory,
yet we find that this increase in disclosure is disconnected from changes in tax avoidance
behavior.
Second, we contribute to the literature on tax transparency initiatives. Mandating
the disclosure of quantitative information can affect firm behavior (Hope et al. (2013),
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Gupta et al. (2014), Henry et al. (2016), Overesch and Wolff (2019), Joshi et al. (2020)
and Joshi (2020)) and it offers valuable information to tax authorities (Bozanic et al.
(2017)). At the extreme, mandating the disclosure of country-level economic activity can
affect the organizational structures of MNEs (De Simone and Olbert (2020)). At the
same time, making tax payments data available to the general public leads to consumer
backlash and negative market reactions for tax aggressive firms (Hoopes et al. (2018)),
that respond by voluntarily enhancing the transparency around their tax affairs (Kays
(2020)). However, only very limited evidence exists on the effects of mandating qualitative
tax information. The paper closest to ours is Xia (2020), which also finds no changes in
tax avoidance behavior in response to the 2016 UK tax reform. Our paper considers
broader implications of this reform for the overall level of qualitative tax disclosure of
affected firms.
More broadly, our paper contributes to the literature on corporate social responsibil-
ity (CSR) by analyzing the real effects of CSR-like narrative disclosure, which are still
comparatively understudied (Christensen et al. (2019)). Not only is paying “responsi-
ble taxes” increasingly viewed as a CSR topic (e.g., Grewal and Serafeim (2020)), but,
similar to tax strategy reports, a key feature that characterizes CSR reporting and sets
it apart from financial reporting includes the diversity of users and uses. Users of CSR
reports tend to be relatively unsophisticated when it comes to reading financial reports,
i.e., workers, consumers, NGOs, and the general public. Since these stakeholders have
mostly a passive relationship with firms, CSR standards that are informative might have
the largest value for this group. When it comes to uses of the CSR reports, stakeholders
can learn about how firms contribute to society and adhere to specific norms and ethical
values (Christensen et al. (2019)). In our context, the tax strategy report can be, for
example, an important tool to effectively convey the story behind complex tax numbers.
Hence, we expect that the tax strategy reports, which are geared towards the wider pub-
lic, may be used to evaluate the firm’s tax strategy based on wider societal norms and
values. Our findings demonstrate that if CSR disclosure mandates are supposed to affect
firm behavior in desirable ways, they need to be very specific (Christensen et al. (2019)).
Otherwise, firms can (over-)comply with the disclosure standard by providing disclosures
without reconciling them with the underlying real activity, e.g., tax avoidance.
2 Institutional Setting
Domestic and international regulations are increasingly mandating multinational enter-
prises around the world to disclose more information on their tax strategies and on the
geographical distribution of tax payments. The United States has been at the forefront
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of such policies with the Dodd-Frank Financial Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
with Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) requiring firms to publicly disclose
contingent tax liabilities and reporting their uncertain tax positions directly to the Inter-
nal Revenue Service (IRS) since 2010. The European Union has followed by mandating
the disclosure of quantitative CbC information for financial institutions (CRD IV and the
Capital Requirements Regulation). Since 2014, financial institutions have to disclose data
on employees, turnover, profits, and taxes at the country level and a list of all entities
or branches and their locations. In 2015, the OECD launched the BEPS Action Plan,
including in Action 13 a proposal for a CbC reporting extending to all industries to be
disclosed only to tax authorities.4 By now, most countries around the world have a CbC
reporting requirement included in their national law.
This increased pressure for tax transparency from international organizations resulted
in voluntary disclosure of qualitative and quantitative tax information in some countries
long before any reform mandating such disclosure was enacted (PwC, 2016). For example,
in the UK in 2015, 64% of the FTSE100 companies disclosed their approach to tax and
56% their tax governance on a voluntary basis. Additionally, 37% provided information
on their total annual tax contributions and 28% where such tax contributions are paid
(i.e., “geographical segment reporting”). Finally, 18% of the selected UK firms published
public information on cash tax reconciliation (i.e., the difference between the statutory
tax charged and the effective tax paid).
More recently, tax authorities around the world started to promote or mandate the
disclosure of qualitative tax information, for example, the Tax Transparency Package
Proposal by the European Commission in 2015 and the tax strategy disclosure regulation
issued by the UK government in 2016. In this paper, we analyze Schedule 19 of the
Finance Act 2016 issued by the UK government mandating large businesses to publish a
tax strategy report.5 This UK regulation, which was passed in Parliament on September
15, 2016, requires certain firms with a UK presence to publish either a separate tax
strategy report on their website or integrate the discussion on their tax strategy in an
existing report, e.g., the annual report. Further, the board is responsible for approving
the tax strategy report. Almost all firms opted for publishing a separate tax strategy
report, and only very few integrated the required discussion of their tax strategy in the
annual report.
4Under the OECD proposal, an additional item, total assets, would be disclosed at the coun-
try level. For a complete overview on Action 13 of the BEPS project, see https://read.oecd-
ilibrary.org/taxation/transfer-pricing-documentation-and-country-by-country-reporting-action-13-2015-
final-report 9789264241480-en#page1 (accessed on 13.04.2020).
5For the complete law, see “Schedule 19 - Large business: tax strategies and sanctions” of the Fi-
nance Act 2016, available at https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2016/24/schedule/19 (accessed on
14.04.2020).
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The information required covers four broad topics. First, firms need to discuss how
UK tax risk is managed, resulting in statements like ”The CFO and Head of Tax oversee
tax risk management, which is undertaken by the Group’s tax team. The tax team consists
of the Head of Tax, who leads the team, two Tax Managers and a Tax Accountant.” or
”Overall responsibility for ensuring that tax risk is managed effectively across the Group
lies with the Board. The Audit Committee reviews the effectiveness of the risk management
process on behalf of the Board.”6 Second, firms should describe their attitude to tax
planning resulting in sentences such as ”Cairn undertakes tax planning that supports our
business and reflects commercial and economic activity. The Group’s policy is not to
enter into any artificial tax avoidance schemes.” or ”Cairn will base its views on the
relevant tax laws in force at the time and seeks to minimize disputes.”7 Third, firms
should offer insights on their tax risk appetite, which led to disclosures like ”It is the aim
of RM to minimize the level of risk taken in relation to both UK and overseas taxation
matters wherever possible. Given the size and diversity of the business, taken with the
complexities of taxation legislation in multiple tax jurisdictions, it is inevitable that an
element of tax risk will arise.” or ”Where complete mitigation of a risk is not possible,
reduction to a minimum level is sought.”8 Fourth, firms should explain their relationship
with HMRC, which was done in sentences like ”The Group is committed to the principles
of integrity, transparency and openness and seeks to apply these in its dealings with the
UK tax authorities.” or ”Where possible we seek constructive and early discussions on any
new tax matter to obtain certainty. We engage positively when discussing any differences
in legal interpretation between ourselves and HMRC.”9
These new disclosure requirements apply to firms that have turnover exceeding GBP
200m and/or their balance sheet total assets exceeding GBP 2bn in the last year.10 Al-
though the first articles highlighting the proposal to introduce a mandatory tax strategy
report are from May 2015; the size threshold was only announced in the summer of 2015
(HMRC (2015)). This threshold applied to turnover and assets in 2015. Thus, we can
rule out anticipation effects. The reform is effective for fiscal years starting on or after
September 2016.
The mandatory disclosure of a tax strategy report is part of a broader package of
measures enacted in 2016, including CbC reporting and ‘special measures’ for persis-
6The sentences are taken from SEGRO’s Tax Strategy.
7The sentences are taken from Cairn’s Tax Strategy.
8The sentences are taken from RM’s Tax Strategy.
9The sentences are taken from Clipper Logistics’ Tax Strategy.
10For more details, see HMRC (2016). UK subsidiaries of an MNE group with global
turnover exceeding EUR 750m are also required to publish a tax strategy report. See Sched-
ule 19 “Large business: tax strategies and sanctions” of the Finance Act 2016, available at
https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2016/24/schedule/19 (accessed on 13.04.2020).
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tently uncooperative behavior, designed to induce improvements in tax compliance of
large businesses.11 The overall aim of this package of reforms was to increase tax revenues
by reducing tax avoidance of large businesses operating in the UK.12 The specific goal
of mandating the publication of a tax strategy report was to influence corporate behav-
ior via increased stakeholder pressure. Thus, forcing large firms to provide insights into
their tax-related practices should discourage aggressive tax planning via increased public
attention on tax practices of corporations (HMRC (2015), Point 1.18.).
Compliance was ensured in two ways. First, there is a penalty for not publishing a
tax strategy report: a non-compliant firm faces a monetary punishment of GBP 7,500
for being caught without a tax strategy report and another GBP 7,500 if the report is
not published six months after it should have been, plus GBP 7,500 for each following
month until the firm becomes compliant. Second, high public pressure on UK firms should
ensure compliance. In 2010, UK firms were subject to public scrutiny from ActionAid
International, a global non-profit organization, highlighting how around 50 percent of the
FTSE100 were not compliant with the requirement to disclose the full list of subsidiaries
and their respective locations in annual reports. The reputational threat was sufficient
to induce almost all FTSE100 to become fully compliant within the two years after the
ActionAid International campaign (Dyreng et al., 2016). There was a similarly successful
public shaming campaign aimed at inducing non-compliant firms to publish their tax
strategy reports (Belnap (2019b)).
3 Hypothesis Development
Bushman et al. (2004) state that corporate transparency is “the widespread availability of
firm-specific information concerning publicly listed firms in the economy to those outside
the firm”. The authors define a conceptual framework for corporate transparency summa-
rizing information devices into three main categories, which include: firms’ information
disclosure (both mandatory and voluntary), private information acquisition (firms’ infor-
mation collected and made publicly available by analysts or institutional investors), and
information dissemination (media information spread). In this paper, we focus on the
first information device - information disclosure.
Information accessibility is a fundamental component to achieve efficient resource-
allocation and, thus, economic growth (e.g., Bushman et al. (2004)). As suggested by the
11Note, that the CbC reporting threshold applies to firms with global turnover exceeding €750m.
Thus, some firms will be affected by the qualitative tax disclosure requirements, but not the quantitative




unraveling result, private information about the true firm performance will be revealed by
managers on a voluntary basis, given certain conditions, such as, for example, costlessness
of information provision and verifiable information (Grossman, 1981; Grossman and Hart,
1980; Milgrom and Roberts, 1986; Milgrom, 1981). However, the required conditions are
often not met in practice, as information disclosure is costly, and this results in managers
exercising discretion in disclosing decision-useful information about the firm to external
stakeholders.13
This means that regulators typically step in to ensure an adequate degree of corpo-
rate transparency. Further, mandating increased disclosure can represent a policy tool
to incentivize desirable behavior complementing the regulations which explicitly prohibit
certain behaviors (see Leuz and Wysocki (2016)). This is especially true in the con-
text of mandating increased transparency in areas such as product quality, environmental
policy, and, more recently, taxation. In general, initiatives promoting or mandating tax
transparency have the goal to improve firms’ accountability and compliance towards stake-
holders, including the general public (Müller et al. (2020)). In this paper, we focus on a
recent trend of demanding qualitative tax disclosure.
We start by discussing the benefits of mandating a non-numerical disclosure. First,
qualitative, as opposed to purely quantitative disclosure, can give more nuanced infor-
mation on firms’ tax affairs. In the context of financial disclosures, textual information
provides insights about the data generating function of the numerical financial data and
helps in understanding corporate decisions (Li (2010)). Since the ETR is often a complex
metric for investors to understand (Hutchens (2019)), increasing the supply of tax-related
information could lead to more transparent resource-allocation decisions. Second, quali-
tative disclosure can also help with addressing behavioral biases in information processing
by less sophisticated users of disclosures (e.g., the general public, employees). This is be-
cause quantitative disclosure may, for instance, lead to the issue of fixation on a particular
set of tax numbers (Kays (2020), Dierynck et al. (2020)). By focusing on a single metric
in the judgment of the firm’s tax position, stakeholders may misinterpret the overall tax
position of the firm (see also Hoopes et al. (2018), Dierynck et al. (2020)). For example,
in a controlled experiment, Dierynck et al. (2020) find that retail investors become worse
at identifying firm’s tax avoidance once they receive extra quantitative tax disclosures
beyond narrative information on ETR reconciliations. Therefore, more nuanced purely
qualitative tax disclosures may be better processed by external parties, especially when
13The intuition underlying the unraveling result is summarized by Verrecchia (1983); ”when a sales-
person, say, withholds information, buyers’ suspicions about the quality of the product are so great that
they discount its quality to the point that the salesperson is always better served to disclose what he
knows. In effect, the threshold level of disclosure collapses to the least favorable possible information the
salesperson can possess; this forces the salesperson to always reveal what he knows.”
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the disclosure targets a broad audience such as the general public. Finally, mandated
qualitative disclosures may increase the informativeness of previously voluntary disclosed
information by providing benchmarks against which users of the disclosed information
can judge the disclosures (Christensen et al. (2019)).
Mandating the disclosure of qualitative tax information can have drawbacks compared
to quantitative tax information because of the inherent characteristics of such disclosure.
First, since it is provided in a non-standardized and new format, qualitative information
can impose high processing costs to external stakeholders (Blankespoor (2019)). Survey
evidence suggests that investors demand less frequent disclosure of qualitative relative to
quantitative information (PwC (2017)). Second, mandating qualitative disclosure might
not affect firms’ behavior through the public pressure channel if the resulting disclosure is
not actionable. Since non-numerical disclosure is often drafted using boilerplate and non-
specific terms (Hope et al. (2016)), we would expect no change in firm behavior following
mandating a tax strategy report if the qualitative statements are uninformative about the
actual tax strategy of the firm.
In 2016, the UK government mandated the disclosure of a tax strategy report with
the aim of (1) increasing overall transparency of firms’ tax affairs and (2) reducing tax
avoidance. In what follows, we discuss the two main hypotheses we build based on the
UK government’s expectations and prior literature.
3.1 Voluntary Disclosure
Given that almost all firms comply with publishing the tax strategy report, we focus our
analysis on studying the effects of the reform on the voluntary disclosure of tax strategy
information in the annual reports. We use this as a proxy for the overall transparency of
firms’ tax affairs. Bozanic et al. (2017) document that when firms are required to privately
disclose quantitative information to the tax authority, they are more likely to voluntarily
disclose the information to the public, as the tax-related proprietary cost of such infor-
mation (e.g., the increased risk of tax audits) is lower. Kays (2020) finds that public
disclosure of quantitative tax information (e.g., firm’s country-level tax payments) by the
tax authority induces firms to provide supplementary voluntary disclosure to the public.
This is positively related to the firm’s expected reputational costs and negatively associ-
ated with the tax-based proprietary costs of such information. The fact that reputational
concerns influence voluntary tax disclosure is supported by survey evidence highlighting
that public pressure has strongly influenced tax disclosure of large firms (PwC (2014)).
Therefore, given that the reform we study specifically targets the general public, one
could expect reputational concerns to induce firms to go beyond what is strictly de-
manded and offer additional information on a voluntary basis. However, reputational
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concerns might not lead to increased transparency around firm’s tax affairs if, due to
the qualitative nature of the disclosure, firms are able to draft the tax strategy report
in a vague language (Freedman and Vella (2015, 2016)). If such reports offer no factual
information stakeholders could use against the firm, then reputational costs might be
limited, and we would expect no change in the voluntary disclosure of tax information in
the annual reports.
Given the above discussion, we state our first hypothesis as follows:
H1: Firms that disclose tax strategy information in a standalone report also increase
their voluntary tax strategy disclosure in the annual report.
H1a: The increase in the voluntary tax strategy disclosure in the annual report will be
smaller for firms with lower quality of their tax strategy reports.
3.2 Tax avoidance
The literature has mainly focused on analyzing the effects of mandating quantitative
tax information on tax avoidance. For example, in the context of FIN48 adoption in
the United States, evidence suggests that public disclosure of additional tax figures on
unrecognized tax benefits enables the detection of tax avoidance (Lisowsky et al. (2013))
and helps to estimate current and future tax figures (Ciconte et al. (2016)). Further, there
was a documented reduction in tax avoidance (measured in terms of changes in different
types of ETRs) after the introduction of FIN48 (e.g., Hope et al. (2013), Gupta et al.
(2014), Henry et al. (2016)).
Since tax authorities tend not to have access to information regarding the segment
of cross-border transactions occurring within their territory, this makes the effectiveness
of administration and enforcement of tax payments difficult (OECD (2017)). Recent tax
transparency initiatives aim at supporting tax authorities in obtaining the full picture
of foreign operations. For example, CbC Reporting gives tax authorities the full orga-
nizational structure of MNE activities abroad and enables them to accurately verify the
information provided in the tax declaration (De Simone and Olbert (2020); Joshi (2020)).
This is supposed to reduce firms’ ability to conduct aggressive tax planning.14 A reduction
(yet limited) in profit shifting behavior has been documented around the introduction of
the public CbC Reporting under the CRD IV (e.g., Joshi et al. (2020); Overesch and
Wolff (2019)).
Requiring the disclosure of qualitative tax information could induce similar benefits
to those of quantitative tax disclosure. Specifically, mandating the publication of a tax
14For more details, see OECD, Action 13.
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strategy report should foster shareholders, investors, and public scrutiny over firms’ tax
affairs. For example, in the UK, intensive media coverage of tax scandals has proved
successful in increasing transparency of firm’s tax affairs and even in reducing their tax
avoidance (Dyreng et al. (2016). Therefore, we would expect that mandating a formalized
written tax strategy has the potential to reduce corporate tax avoidance via increased
public scrutiny of firms’ tax affairs. However, we might expect no change in tax avoidance
behavior if the resulting disclosure is vague and boilerplate. This could be the case, even
when clear categories of disclosure are demanded by regulation, as is the case under
Schedule 19 of the Finance Act 2016. Firms might even be tempted to provide no factual
information, as, for instance, the online guideline of UK tax authorities explicitly allows
firms to avoid disclosing any “information that might be commercially sensitive”.
Given the above discussion, we state our second hypothesis as follows:
H2: Firms do not reduce the level of tax avoidance as a result of the mandatory
disclosure of a tax strategy report.
4 Sample Selection and Variable Measurement
4.1 Sample Construction
Our initial sample consists of 1,895 listed firms that have headquarters in the UK based on
the ownership information from Bureau Van Dijk Orbis database. We focus our analysis
on listed firms for two reasons. First, to construct our measure of tax disclosure, we require
firms to have easily accessible and comparable annual reports, i.e., all written under
IFRS (international financial reporting standards) rather than local generally accepted
accounting principles (GAAP) standard. Second, listed firms are potentially subject to
more public scrutiny (Dyreng et al., 2016). Thus, we expect that those firms would face
the highest compliance burden and the highest reputational costs. The reason we focus on
UK MNEs is two-fold. First, being MNEs, they face similar tax avoidance opportunities,
which are different from those of domestic firms (Bilicka, 2019). Second, all UK MNEs face
similar compliance burdens with respect to the 2016 reform. These are higher compared
to non-UK headquartered, foreign MNEs, for which only part of the structure is subject
to the regulation.
For each of those 1,895 firms, we obtain data from four different sources. Accounting
data and firm information come from Datastream; profile information on board members
is from BoardEx; firm media exposure comes from RavenPack. We merge these datasets
using ISIN numbers. Annual reports are from the Perfect Information Filings Experts
database, where they are stored using firm names. We match firms from the Perfect
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Information Filings Experts database by firm name to firms in Datastream. We then
remove observations for which the annual report has not been correctly converted. We
remove observations for which we have no financial data on relevant variables (tax paid,
pre-tax income, assets, sales) two years prior and two years after the reform. Next, we
restrict our sample to firms that are not subject to CbC reporting and are not small-to-
medium-sized firms.15 In the UK, the CbC Reporting requirement was also introduced in
2016 but at a different size threshold, i.e., for MNEs having sales above EUR 750 Million.
Excluding these firms enables us to isolate the effect of mandating the disclosure of a
tax strategy report. Our cleaned sample consists of 2,104 firm-year observations for 225
unique firms. Table 1 provides an overview of each step for the final sample selection.
Using this sample, we construct a treatment and a control group for our analysis. Our
treated firms are MNEs that have to publish tax strategy reports from 2016 onward but
do not have to disclose a CbC Reporting: i.e., firms that have over GBP 200 million in
annual sales or GBP 2 billion of total assets but have sales below EUR 750 Million. Firms
in our control group are those that do not have to publish the tax strategy report and are
not SMEs. Of the 225 firms in our sample 113 are treated and 112 belong to the control
group.
4.2 Measure of Tax Strategy Disclosure
We construct a measure of tax strategy disclosure in the annual reports by employing
textual analysis techniques. We pick a representative sub-sample of annual reports and
manually collect sentences in which firms discuss their tax strategy. Our classification is
based on PwC analysis studying the voluntary tax disclosure in annual reports of firms
listed in the FTSE100 ((PwC, 2016)). The analysis conducted by PwC considers five
categories of information: approach to tax, tax governance, cash tax reconciliation, total
tax contribution, and geographical reporting of the tax liability. We only consider the
first two categories because they represent purely qualitative tax information and reflect
the information required in the tax strategy reports under Schedule 19 of the Finance Act
2016.
We use our manually constructed training sample to classify the tax sentences in all
annual reports using the näıve Bayes classifier.16 Based on the classified sentences in
each annual report, we construct a measure of firm-year level qualitative tax information
15To identify SMEs, we use the definition provided under the UK R&D tax credit regulation. SMEs
are firms with less than 50 employees, less than GBP 11.4 Million total assets, and/or less than GBP
22.8 Million annual turnover. Removing SMEs under this specific definition alleviates the concerns that
differences in ETRs are not driven by tax avoidance but by the different generosity of the R&D tax credit
for SME versus non-SME.
16For a detailed discussion on the technique used in this paper, please see Appendix A.3.
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disclosure, which is equal to the number of tax strategy sentences in a firm’s annual report.
In Appendix A.3, we include examples of the tax strategy sentences classified using the
trained näıve Bayes classifier. We also create a scaled and a binary version of this measure
by (a) dividing the total number of tax strategy sentences by the total number of sentences
in the annual report or (b) setting the variable equal to one when the number of sentences
describing tax strategy is greater than zero, respectively. While our first two measures
capture the volume of the tax strategy disclosure, the latter captures the decision of a
firm to provide a tax strategy disclosure in its annual report at all. In untabulated results,
we consider which firm characteristics determine which firms voluntarily discuss their tax
strategy before the 2016 reform and the extent of such disclosure. We show that media
attention weakly incentivizes a firm to offer insights into its tax practices. An important
driver of a firm’s willingness to discuss its tax strategy and the extent of such disclosure
is board composition. Firms with a higher degree of tax and accounting expertise by the
board members tend to disclose their firm tax strategy in the annual reports, and in such
firms, this type of disclosure is, on average, longer compared to firms with no tax and
accounting expertise by the board members.
4.3 Measures of Tax Avoidance
Following Hanlon and Heitzman (2010), we employ two commonly used tax avoidance
proxies available when analyzing non-US settings, Cash and Book ETRs.17 Note that
both of those capture non-conforming tax avoidance only and do not capture changes
in tax accounting accruals. However, our sample is exclusively composed of listed firms,
which face high capital market pressure and thus are less likely to adopt conforming tax
avoidance (e.g., Hanlon and Heitzman (2010); Badertscher et al. (2019)). Further, Cash
ETR captures tax deferral strategies, which are not included in the Book ETR measure.
Following the related literature, we drop ETR observations in loss years, since losses
distort ETR-based tax measures and make them hard to interpret (e.g., Dyreng et al.
(2017), Chyz et al. (2019), Robinson et al. (2010)).
5 Empirical Strategy
5.1 Difference-in-difference Estimation
In this section, we discuss our identification strategy to test the effect of mandating
disclosure of qualitative tax information. We use the introduction of mandatory tax
17The lack of foreign tax expenses prevent us from using book-tax difference proxies and reporting of
the item ”unrecognized tax benefit” is not required under IFRS.
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strategy reporting in the UK in 2016 as an exogenous shock to tax information disclosure
and employ a difference-in-difference strategy. This legislation requires groups over a
certain size to disclose additional qualitative tax information. Thus we consider firms
that have to publish a tax strategy report as treated firms. As control group, we use firms
that are below the size threshold and are not required to publish a tax strategy report.
Our difference-in-difference specification takes the following form:
ReformOutcomesit = α + β1Postt × TaxStrategyReporti
+BXit + γi + δt + εit
(1)
where i is firm, and t is year. Postt is a dummy, which denotes years after 2016.
TaxStrategyReporti is a dummy equal to one for those firms that are required to publish
a tax strategy report. As firm-level controls (Xit), we follow Balakrishnan et al. (2019) and
use size, leverage, age, geographical complexity, market to book ratio, operating volatility,
an information production quantity proxy, and performance volatility. We include firm
(γi) and year (δt) fixed effects. Thus, we estimate the effect of mandatory disclosure using
the within-firm variation. We add two-way cluster robust standard errors at the firm-year
level.
We examine the effect of the reform on tax strategy disclosure in annual reports
by looking at the volume of tax strategy sentences (TSDit) in the annual report as an
outcome variable. We alternatively use the scaled version of TSD, where we scale by
the total number of sentences in the annual report. Second, we test whether mandating
a tax strategy report has an impact on firm tax avoidance, measured by Cash ETR
(CashETRit) or Book ETR (BookETRit). Hypothesis 1 indicates that the reform will
positively affect disclosure in the annual reports. Thus, we expect coefficient β1 to be
positive and significant in regressions with TSD as a dependent variable. Hypothesis 2
suggests no effect on tax avoidance. Hence, we expect the coefficient on β1 to have a small
magnitude and to be insignificant in specifications with Cash or Book ETRs as outcome
variables.
5.2 Event Study
Our identification strategy is based on the assumption that qualitative tax disclosure and
the appetite for tax avoidance for the control and treated firms would have evolved in
parallel in the absence of treatment. We test this assumption using event study method-
ology. We also use this method to evaluate the speed with which the reform affects our
outcome variables. We estimate equation 2 separately for control and treated group, a
version of equation 1, in which we replace the coefficient on the interaction between the
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post-2016 dummy and the treated firm indicator with seven separate indicator variables,
each marking one year during the t-4 to t+3 periods relative to the year before the treat-
ment event date (t=0). We omit the indicator for period t-1 to serve as benchmark. The
treatment indicators are binned at endpoints, such that t-4 indicates treatment at time
t-4 and all previous ones. Hence, we do not plot the estimates for t-4 (McCrary, 2007).




βk ×Dkt + γi +BXit + εit (2)
The variables of interest are the dummies Dkt that indicate a point in time k periods
from the reform year (2016). The coefficient on each of those dummies estimates the
difference in each dependent variable in that year relative to year k-1 (2015). As dependent
variable, we use different reform outcomes described above. We add firm fixed effects




Tax strategy reports In Table 2, we summarize the characteristics of tax strategy
reports. We manually search for those reports for every treated firm in our sample and
find information for 74 out of 113 firms.18 First, the length of documents in our treated
sample varies substantially between 63 words and 3,166 words. In Appendix AA.4, we
present examples of two extreme cases. RPS, a UK MNE offering professional services,
provides a one-page long tax strategy report where the description of its tax planning
strategy and its relationship to tax authorities is limited to a few lines, while the discussion
of its risk management extends over three paragraphs. Jupiter, a UK fund management
group, presents an eleven pages long tax strategy report where, besides the mandatory
topics, an overview of the firm’s total tax contribution and geographical distribution of
18Schedule 19 of the 2016 Finance Act set thresholds at the unconsolidated level. Under UK law,
UK parents are not required to disclose their unconsolidated profit and loss account when having a
consolidated one (see Company Act 2006 – S408). Thus, we have no access to unconsolidated data for
UK MNEs. We rely on the assumption that if a UK MNE firm falls above the threshold using consolidated
data it also does using unconsolidated data. This represents a well-founded assumption based on a survey
we conducted with experts from the Big4 located in the UK. However, since we do not find tax strategy
reports for 39 treated firms in our sample, we check the robustness of our baseline results, excluding those
treated firms without tax strategy reports, and (untabulated) results are unchanged.
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tax payments is offered.
Second, the guidelines issued by the UK tax authorities highlight the necessity to
mention the law under which the tax strategy report is written, namely Schedule 19 of
the UK Finance Act 2016. We use a firm’s mentioning of the law as a proxy for the
degree of compliance. While the guidelines on the content for each category are very
broad, and there is no rule on the report title, the mentioning of the law represents the
only strict requirement for the drafting of such a report. Surprisingly, not all firms in our
sample comply with this requirement, as 16 percent do not mention ”Schedule 19” and/or
”Finance Act 2016” in their tax strategy report.
Third, we measure the quality of the reports using specificity and similarity. To
capture the degree of specificity, we calculate how often the text refers to specific people,
places, organizations, times, or numbers divided by the total number of words, following
Dyer et al. (2017) and Hope et al. (2016). To capture the degree of similarity across firms’
disclosure, we compare tax strategy reports using WCopyFind, an open-source tool that
is able to detect similar sentences across documents and has been used in the related
literature ((Belnap, 2019a; McMullin, 2016)).
We find that the quality of the reports varies substantially. On average, the degree
of specificity is 7 percent, with a peak at 8 percent (Figure 1). In Appendix A.4, we
present an example of a disclosure with a high degree of specificity. Macfarlane, a UK
packaging and label MNE, scores 19 percent on our specificity index. For example, it
states the exact period of time to which the described tax payment overview refers, it
describes organizational details of the tax function, and it lists each subsidiary with the
corresponding name and location.
We find the average similarity score between tax strategy reports to be 11 percent,
with a peak of observations at 4 percent (1). These vary between no similarity at all to
64 percent similarity, and around 6 percent of the analyzed reports display a similarity
level exceeding 30 percent. In Appendix A.4, we show a side-by-side comparison of two
tax strategy reports where the detected level of similarity is 63 percent. 19
Annual reports disclosure and tax avoidance In Table 3, we show the overall pre-
2016 univariate descriptive statistics for the variables used in our analysis, while in Table
A1 in the Appendix, we break these down into treatment and control groups. Firms in
our sample disclosed, on average, 4.7 tax strategy sentences in their annual reports before
2016, which corresponds to 0.3 percent of the total number of sentences in the annual
19Our distribution of similarity score frequencies is right-skewed as the one of Belnap (2019a), who
conducted an analysis of tax strategy reports focusing only on UK firms belonging to foreign MNE groups.
But, the average level of similarity in our sample is substantially lower than the one found by Belnap
(2019a).
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report. Firms in the treated group disclosed, on average, 5.5 sentences while those in the
control group disclosed 3.4 sentences.
Figure 2 depicts the evolution of the average number of tax strategy sentences, non-tax
strategy sentences, and the fraction of tax strategy divided by the total sentences in the
annual report for control and treated firms separately. First, the average number of tax
strategy sentences increased over the years for both treated and control groups. Second,
on average, treated firms include more tax strategy and non-tax strategy sentences in
their annual reports relative to the control group. Finally, there is a clear jump in the
number (and ratio) of tax strategy sentences for the treated group starting in 2016 that
we do not observe for the control group.
Firms in our sample have mean Cash and Book ETRs of 23.2% and 24.9%, respectively.
In Table A1, we show that treated firms report having similar Cash and Book ETRs to
control group firms prior to the 2016 reform. Treated firms are significantly larger, they
have more leverage, they are older, and less likely to be loss-making. This is to be expected
given that the threshold to belong to the treated groups depends on size and turnover.
Since we show that our outcome variables of interest evolve similarly before the reform,
these level differences in other observable firm-level characteristics do not invalidate our
identification strategy.
Finally, Table 4 reports Pearson correlation coefficients for the key variables in the
regression analysis. At the p < 0.05 level, both Cash ETR and voluntary tax strategy
disclosure in annual reports are positively correlated with Media Attention (corr. =
0.293 and corr. = 0.121). Additionally, Cash ETR is significantly positively correlated
with the volume of voluntary tax strategy disclosure in annual reports (corr. = 0.087),
but significantly negatively correlated with the volume of the mandatory tax strategy
disclosure in the separate report (corr. = - 0.079). Further, Cash ETR is negatively
correlated with the quality of the separate tax strategy report, both with respect to
compliance level (corr. = -0.128) and specificity level (corr. = -0.081). This suggests
that firms with higher Cash ETR may have a preference for discussing their tax strategy
at length in the annual report. In turn, voluntary tax strategy disclosure in annual
reports is positively correlated with the volume of the mandatory tax strategy disclosure
in the separate report (corr. = 0.100) but negatively with the specificity level (corr. =
-0.151). This provides some evidence that voluntary disclosure in the annual reports is
a complement, rather than a substitute, for disclosure in tax strategy reports. However,
the length of discussion does not necessarily come with a high degree of specific details,
which points towards the potential un-informativeness of the tax strategy disclosure.
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6.2 Benchmark Results
In this section, we describe our baseline difference-in-difference and event study results.
In Panel A of Table 5, we present results for tax strategy disclosure (TSD) in the annual
reports. Column (1) reports the effect on disclosure measured in terms of the absolute
number of tax strategy sentences, while column (2) reports the effect on the tax strategy
sentences scaled by the total number of sentences in the annual report. We find that,
for affected firms, the tax strategy disclosure in the annual report significantly increased
relative to the control firms after the reform. This is true for both the absolute and scaled
number of tax strategy sentences. Results from column (1) indicate that treated firms
increased the number of sentences describing their tax strategy in the annual report by
3.2 on average, compared to control firms after the reform. Given that the average treated
firm had 5.5 tax strategy sentences in their annual report prior to the reform (Table A1),
this suggests an increase of almost 60 percent.
In Panels a) and b) in Figure 3, we present the corresponding dynamic event study
results. We plot coefficient estimates for each year separately for the treated and control
group together with the 95 percent confidence intervals. We show that treated and con-
trol group firms are no different in terms of their tax strategy disclosure prior to 2016,
even though both types of firms increase this disclosure throughout the sample period.
However, since the reform, treated firms increased their tax strategy disclosure at a much
quicker rate than control group firms. To the extent that annual reports are read by a
wider range of stakeholders than tax strategy reports, this suggests a salient effect of the
reform on tax transparency.
In Panel B in Table 5, we report the effect of the reform on Cash and Book ETR.
We find no significant effect for our treated firms after the reform using both of our tax
avoidance measures. Further, the point estimates are also close to zero. In Panels c) and
d) in Figure 3, we present the corresponding dynamic event study results. We show that
there was no significant difference in ETRs between treated and control firms before the
reform in any of the pre-periods, as well as in any post-treatment periods.
7 Additional Analysis
7.1 Are Firm Reactions Driven by Public Pressure?
In the hypothesis development, we identify public pressure as a potential mechanism
through which tax avoidance and voluntary qualitative disclosure in the annual reports
may be affected after the reform. The literature offers mixed evidence on the effects of
public pressure on firm behavior (e.g., Chen et al. (2019); Dyreng et al. (2020); Dyreng
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et al. (2016)). In our setting, Belnap (2019b) shows that media scrutiny was used effec-
tively to induce compliance with respect to publishing tax strategy reports for US MNCs.
To test whether public pressure plays an important role in driving our results, we repeat
the analysis from section 6.1, splitting the sample into firms subject to high and low media
attention measured in pre-reform years. Firms in the high media attention category have
above-median news coverage prior to the reform, while firms in the low media attention
category have below-median news coverage. We complement this result by splitting firms
into business to consumer (B2C) and business to business (B2B) firms in columns (3) and
(4), respectively, where B2C firms are more likely to be exposed to consumer scrutiny.
We present the results in Table 6.
In column (1) in Panel A, we show that treated firms subject to high media attention
do not significantly increase their tax strategy disclosure relative to the control group
firms after the reform. In column (2), we show that the increase in tax strategy disclosure
observed in our baseline estimates is driven by firms subject to low media attention prior
to the reform.20 Note that the pre-reform average number of tax strategy sentences in the
annual reports is 5.9 for the control group firms subject to high media attention, while it
is only 3.7 for firms in low media attention sub-sample (reported at the bottom of panel
A). In Figure A1 in the Appendix, we plot the dynamic evolution of these coefficients
separately for treatment and control groups. We find that both treated and control group
firms subject to high media attention increase their tax strategy disclosure in their annual
reports, which explains why we find no effect in the difference-in-difference estimates.
They also both start from higher benchmark voluntary disclosure. This suggests that
firms subject to public attention feel the need to justify their tax positions to outside
stakeholders even before the mandate, and that need increases following the tax strategy
report mandate, even if they are not subject to that mandate itself. This is consistent
with the public exerting pressure on those firms to do so and managers possibly expecting
their control group firms to be subject to tax strategy reporting mandates soon as well.
In turn, only treated firms subject to low media attention prior to the reform increase
their disclosure significantly. One potential explanation is that the reform draws public
attention to these firms. The results using B2B and B2C firms in columns (3) and (4)
broadly confirm the high media attention ones.21 Taken together, these results suggest
that high media scrutiny may be an important driver of qualitative tax strategy disclosure
in annual reports.
20Note that we do not find these coefficients to be statistically significantly different from each other,
but that can be due to the small sample size.
21Note that only very few firms in our sample are non-B2C. Thus our preferred split to analyze the the
public pressure channel is to distinguish firms by the level of media attention. Further, media attention
is a firm-level measure of potential public pressure, while B2C vs. B2B is industry level.
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In Panel B of Table A1, we consider the effects of the reform on Cash ETR for firms
subject to different media attention levels. We find no significant effect in any of the
specifications suggesting that public pressure does not affect real behavior. At most, it
looks like firms subject to low media attention before the reform decreased their Cash
ETR. If anything, this would suggest an increase in tax avoidance, but the effect is not
statistically significant.
7.2 The Role of Firm Characteristics
In this section, we discuss the relationship between firm-level characteristics and the effects
of the reform on tax avoidance and voluntary disclosure by repeating the baseline analysis
from section 6.1 splitting the sample based on these firm-level characteristics. We consider
the following to be relevant: (1) the volume of the pre-reform voluntary disclosure, (2) the
level of tax avoidance, and (3) the presence of board members with a tax and accounting
background. We measure the volume of pre-reform voluntary disclosure by the mean
number of tax strategy sentences before the reform. We classify firms as high volume
pre-reform voluntary disclosing if their tax strategy disclosure is above the median of all
firms pre-treatment. We classify firms as high tax-avoiding if their average Cash ETR
before the reform is below the median of all firms pre-treatment. Following Chychyla
et al. (2019), we define an accounting expert as a board member with at least one of the
following qualifications: has a CPA (or similar certification), or has been employed either
as an auditor, tax professional, financial controller, treasurer, or CFO.
Pre-reform Voluntary Disclosure In our setting, certain firms voluntarily disclose
their tax strategy in their annual report even before the regulatory requirement. Firms
often used this voluntary tax strategy disclosure to showcase their low levels of tax avoid-
ance. For example, one firm writes in its annual report: “...the group has established ethics
regarding its tax policy which have been ratified by the board. These include the following
key points: a commitment to ensure full compliance with all statutory obligations includ-
ing full disclosure to all relevant tax authorities [of ] any tax planning strategy entered into
...”, while a second one writes: “we take our corporate responsibility seriously with respect
to taxation and aim to be a good corporate citizen by bearing our fair share of the tax
burden”.22 With a mandate for tax disclosure, the signal from voluntary disclosure would
be diminished. Thus, if voluntary disclosure is used to signal low tax avoidance before the
reform, high-disclosing firms should choose to increase their disclosure after the reform
22In Table A3 in the Appendix, we show that firms that are are voluntary disclosing tax strategy
information before the reform have a higher Cash ETR, although this difference is not statistically
significant.
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even further to distinguish themselves from the previously non-disclosing firms. For the
same reasons, they could also reduce their tax avoidance.
In columns (1) and (2) in Table 7, we show results for disclosure outcomes, while
corresponding columns in Table 8 include results for the tax avoidance outcome. In column
(1), we restrict the sample to firms with above-median voluntary disclosure of tax strategy
before the reform, while in column (2), to firms with below-median voluntary disclosure.
We find that treated firms, which were voluntarily disclosing more information on their tax
strategy in the annual reports prior to the reform, increased their disclosure significantly
relative to the control group firms that were also voluntarily disclosing more in pre-reform
years. In turn, we show no significant difference in disclosure outcomes for treated firms
with below-median voluntary disclosure prior to the reform. This finding supports the
hypothesis that firms that want to distinguish themselves by voluntary disclosure prior
to the reform also feel the pressure to provide more comprehensive disclosure than their
peers after the reform.
Pre-reform Tax Avoidance On the one hand, firms with high pre-reform tax avoid-
ance could increase voluntary disclosure and reduce tax avoidance more. As they may
be more exposed to public attention after the reform, they may feel that they have to
justify their tax positions, and if they cannot do so credibly, they may reduce their tax
avoidance. On the other hand, firms with high pre-reform tax avoidance may continue
avoiding taxes and may avoid increasing their disclosure to not draw too much attention
to their practices.
In columns (3) and (4) in Table 7, we test this empirically and show that firms with
low tax avoidance levels prior to the reform, i.e., those with higher Cash ETRs, increase
their disclosure more relative to the control group with similar Cash ETR before the
reform and relative to firms that were more likely to have high tax avoidance levels prior
to the reform. Note that both groups increase their voluntary disclosure in the annual
reports, just by different magnitudes. This further underscores that firms that are less
likely to avoid taxes use the tax strategy disclosure on their annual reports to signal their
“good” compliance behavior.
Presence of Tax and Accounting Board Members The reform requires that a
board member signs off the tax strategy report. According to the tax authorities, imposing
board-level oversight on the tax strategy report should ensure that the tax strategy is
discussed in the boardroom. Additionally, survey evidence suggests that board members
discourage harmful tax practices (TNS (2015)). We split the sample according to whether
the board includes any tax expertise to test whether the board member involvement in tax
matters reduces tax avoidance, as the government hoped. If the board already included
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someone with tax expertise, issues of tax strategy were likely to be already discussed at
the board level. As such, we expect firms with a tax specialist on the board to change their
disclosure and tax avoidance by less than those without tax or accounting background
members. In columns (5) and (6) in Table 7, we show that this is empirically true.23
Heterogeneity in Tax Avoidance Outcomes In Table 8, we consider the same sub-
sample splits but look at tax avoidance as an outcome variable. We continue to find no
significant effect of the reform on Cash ETRs. These results suggest that even for those
sub-groups that increased the disclosure of their tax strategies in their annual reports
substantially, the qualitative information demanded is not imposing large enough costs
to change their real behavior. If anything, the direction of coefficients suggests a decrease
in Cash ETRs for firms that did not voluntarily disclose a lot of information on their
tax strategies (column 2), those that had high levels of tax avoidance prior to the reform
(column 3), and those with a tax or accounting board member (column 5). Taken together,
our results suggest that for firms with purposefully higher levels of tax avoidance, the tax
strategy mandate may enable them to explain some of their more aggressive practices to
the general public and continue engaging in these.
7.3 The Role of Disclosure Quality
In this section, we discuss the interplay between the type of disclosure firms include in
their tax strategy reports and their annual reports. We focus on the quality of the separate
tax strategy report and test whether that affects voluntary disclosure and tax avoidance of
treated firms. Consistent with hypothesis 1a, we expect that the increase in the voluntary
tax strategy disclosure in the annual report will be smaller for firms with lower quality
tax strategy reports. We conjecture that firms with a higher quality tax strategy report
are likely to comply with the reform to a larger extent and may also reduce their tax
avoidance as a result. If post-reform voluntary disclosure is not related to a commitment
to provide real information, we would not expect a change.
In Tables 9 and 10, we repeat the benchmark results from section 6.1, splitting our
sample by the quality of the separately published tax strategy reports. We proxy the
quality of the tax strategy reports by the length (column 1), the specificity (column 2),
the similarity (column 3) and the compliance with the disclosure requirements (column
4). Since the differences in the quality of tax strategy reports only exist for treated
firms, we keep all control group firms in all heterogeneity splits. We find that firms
with longer, more specific, and more similar tax strategy reports that comply with the
23Note that these coefficients are not statistically significantly different from each other, but their
relative magnitudes support our hypothesis.
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disclosure requirements by explicitly citing the law increase their tax strategy disclosure
in their annual reports more than firms with low-quality tax strategy reports.24 These
results suggest that higher voluntary tax strategy disclosure in annual reports is related to
higher quality tax strategy disclosures. Therefore, spill-over to annual report disclosures
seems to be a sign of more informative compliance with the reform. Further, results from
column (1) suggest that firms with longer tax strategy reports also voluntarily disclose
more information on their tax strategy in their annual reports. Again, similar to evidence
from Table 4, this is in line with a view that disclosure in the annual reports is not a
substitute, but a complement, to the tax strategy report.
In Table 10, we show the corresponding heterogeneity splits for Cash ETRs. We do
not observe a change in Cash ETRs for firms with high-quality tax strategy reports.
However, we show that low quality of tax strategy reports is linked with lower Cash
ETRs. Specifically, firms with shorter tax strategy reports and lower compliance levels
significantly increase their tax avoidance following the reform. Note that the differences
in coefficients between high- and low-quality splits are statistically significant here. These
results suggest that firms can reduce their Cash ETRs when the quality of their strategy
report is poor without reputational consequences. If the mandated disclosure was tight
enough, firms would not be able to have poor quality tax strategy disclosures. One possible
explanation is that qualitative tax disclosure is not actionable for outside stakeholders,
even if firms comply with the disclosure mandate.
8 Robustness Checks
In this section, we discuss several tests we conduct to check the robustness of our base-
line findings. First, we examine how our results are affected by choice of an alternative
identification strategy. Second, we consider how a different classification of tax strategy
sentences in the annual reports influences our conclusions. Third, we use alternative mea-
sures of tax avoidance as outcomes and run specifications without control variables. The
results we discuss here are not tabulated to simplify the paper’s exposition.
We chose a difference-in-difference design as our preferred identification strategy. How-
ever, a regression discontinuity design would, in principle, also be suitable. Note that in
the regression discontinuity analysis, the sample is restricted to firms just around the
treatment threshold; therefore, the measured effect is local, and this would reduce our
relatively small sample even further. Nevertheless, we can demonstrate the existence of
discontinuity in the number of tax strategy sentences in the annual report around the
24Note that the coefficients are only statistically significantly different in case of firms with different
law compliance levels. Again, this can be due to the small sample we have.
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reporting threshold, but not for Cash ETRs. We use this to estimate the effect of the
mandate on our outcome variables. We find these results to be broadly similar to our
baseline. In particular, we find that the reform increases the tax strategy disclosure in an-
nual reports by 3.3 sentences, on average, which is a similar magnitude to that presented
in the benchmark estimates in Table 5.
Our preferred method of identifying tax strategy sentences in the annual reports in-
volves using a naive Bayesian algorithm, which could be considered a complex method.
However, for the purpose of our analysis, the dictionary approach that simply counts the
number of sentences that use the word tax is not that well suited. There is no set of
ideal keywords, which we can use to clearly identify tax strategy sentences. When a firm
discusses its approach to tax or tax governance, examples of the most frequent phrases
include group tax, tax laws, tax rate, and tax position. The above-listed words can be
used in several other tax contexts in the annual reports not related to tax strategy. Thus,
it is the sentence as a whole that determines whether a firm is discussing its approach
to tax or tax governance. Still, as a robustness test, we construct a very conservative
dictionary-based count of the most frequent words used in tax strategy sentences but not
used in non-tax strategy sentences. We use this dictionary approach to classify sentences
in the annual reports. Since we explicitly exclude words that appear in both types of
sentences, the resulting classification severely under-estimates the volume of the true tax
strategy sentences in the annual reports. We find that the tax strategy mandate signif-
icantly increases voluntary disclosure in the annual reports. However, the magnitude of
the effect is much smaller; we find a 0.8 tax strategy sentences increase. This is consistent
with the conservative way we construct the tax strategy sentences count here.
Our benchmark results use Cash and Book ETRs as a main tax avoidance measure. As
an alternative, we can use size- and industry-adjusted Cash and Book ETRs, following the
measure of tax aggressiveness developed by Balakrishnan et al. (2019). A positive value
would indicate an increase in tax avoidance. Our results suggest no significant change in
tax avoidance using this alternative measure. Our coefficients have positive magnitudes;
hence, if anything, this would suggest that firms are more tax aggressive after the reform.
Finally, we check the robustness of our results by running all specifications without control
variables. The coefficient magnitudes and directions are broadly similar; in particular, we
find no reductions in tax avoidance across all tests and an increase in voluntary tax
strategy disclosure in annual reports.
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9 Conclusion
Currently, governments around the world are taking action to reduce corporate tax avoid-
ance and increase tax transparency. In this study, we focus on one of such measures,
mandating qualitative tax disclosure, and investigate its effects on firm behavior. We find
that affected firms increase tax disclosure in their annual reports, but we find no effect on
tax avoidance behavior. We show that public pressure plays an important role in incen-
tivizing firms to increase their tax strategy disclosure in their annual reports. Further, we
emphasize that the quality of tax strategy reports is key in enforcing compliance with the
law, especially when it comes to reducing tax avoidance. As such, we demonstrate the
difficulty of generating a standard that avoids low-quality disclosures when the disclosure
mandate is asking for qualitative information only. The results of our study contribute to
a better understanding of the differences between demanding qualitative and quantitative
tax disclosures on firm activities. In contrast to mandates for quantitative tax disclosures,
our findings suggest that qualitative information may not be actionable for outside stake-
holders, and firms may instead use increased qualitative disclosures as a type of insurance
against negative public attention.
The goal of the policymakers was to mandate firms to explain their tax strategy to a
wide audience and a broad set of stakeholders and to reduce tax avoidance. Our findings
suggest that firms comply and even over-comply with the regulation, showing an image
of exceptional “tax citizens” but this does not change their real behavior. This over-
compliance may, at the extreme, reduce the informativeness of tax strategy disclosures in
the annual reports and impose large opportunity costs on managers having to draft these
disclosures. Further, since the UK tax strategy reports are in many respects similar to
tax CSR disclosures, which are becoming more common, our findings are of relevance to
policymakers thinking about introducing these regulations.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: Sample Selection Steps.
Unique Firm-Year
Firms Observations
Unbalanced sample: Domestic MNEs with




Domestic MNEs with available BoardEx
data for the period 2010-2019
976 8,375
Domestic MNEs with available Raven-
pack data for the period 2010-2015
814 3,963
Domestic MNEs with available correctly
converted documents from Perfect Infor-
mation for the period 2010-2019
752 4,942
Sample balanced on sales, taxes paid, total
assets and cash ETR for the period 2014-
2018
699 6,600
Dropping SMEs (270) (2,503)
Dropping CbCR (204) (1,993)
Final Sample 225 2,104
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics - Tax Strategy Reports.
Variable Obs Mean St. Dev. Min P25 Median P75 Max
Length 74 772 477 63 527 697 947 3,166
Compliance 74 0.835 0.371 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Specificity 74 0.070 0.031 0.019 0.051 0.067 0.087 0.189
Similarity 74 0.112 0.143 0.000 0.030 0.055 0.11 0.640
Note: This table presents summary sample statistics related to relevant variables used in the
analysis on the tax strategy reports. For the sample of treated firms, we manually collected 74
tax strategy report. All variables are defined in Appendix A.
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics.
Variable Obs Mean St. Dev. P25 Median P75
TSD 621 4.697 5.409 1.000 3.000 6.000
TSD (scaled) 621 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.005
Cash ETR 1,039 0.232 0.210 0.092 0.200 0.290
Book ETR 1,064 0.249 0.183 0.159 0.234 0.298
B2C 1,159 0.837 0.370 1.000 1.000 1.000
Media Attention 942 7.598 8.485 2.000 4.000 13.000
Board (% Tax & Acc) 1,012 0.220 0.125 0.126 0.200 0.286
Size 1,066 11.942 1.383 10.950 12.004 12.998
Leverage 1,155 0.137 0.183 0.000 0.069 0.213
Age 1,159 3.036 0.772 2.639 3.178 3.584
Geographic Complexity 1,159 0.584 0.310 0.343 0.537 0.907
Mkt to Book Ratio 1,066 1.226 1.347 0.458 0.795 1.423
Std Dev of Sales 1,099 9.800 1.073 9.076 9.827 10.497
Analyst Following 968 1.530 0.612 1.099 1.386 1.946
Std Dev of Returns 1,070 2.229 0.456 1.955 2.204 2.484
Note: This table presents the pre-2016 summary sample statistics related to relevant variables
used in the analysis. The sample consists of 1,159 firm-year observations representing 224 unique
firms which do not have a loss observation for each year or for which we are not missing the
annual report. The data therefore spans the 2010–2015 fiscal year period. All variables are
defined in Appendix A. All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles besides Cash
and Book ETRs which are winsorized to be between 0 and 1.
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Table 4: Pearson Correlation Matrix.
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 TSD 1.000
2 Cash ETR 0.087 1.000
3 B2C 0.001 0.017 1.000
4 Media Attention 0.293 0.121 -0.020 1.000
5 Board (% Tax & Acc) 0.079 -0.022 0.014 -0.020 1.000
6 Length 0.100 -0.079 0.115 0.049 -0.152 1.000
7 Compliance -0.005 -0.128 0.095 0.054 -0.091 0.318 1.000
9 Specificity -0.151 -0.081 0.133 -0.271 0.339 -0.082 -0.019 1.000
10 Similarity 0.015 0.006 -0.099 0.020 0.101 0.041 0.179 0.033 1.000
Note: This table presents the Pearson correlation coefficients for key variables in the regression analysis. The significant correlation coefficients
at a 0.05 level are bolded. All variables are defined in Appendix A.
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Table 5: The Effect of Mandatory Qualitative Tax Disclosure Regulation.
(1) (2)
Panel A: Voluntary Tax Disclosure
Dep. Var. TSD TSD (scaled)
Treated × Post 3.182** 0.000997*
(1.103) (0.000530)
Observations 1,048 1,048
Number of Firms 145 145
R-squared 0.814 0.758
Panel B: Tax Avoidance
Dep. Var. Cash ETR Book ETR
Treated × Post -0.00810 0.00772
(0.0255) (0.0216)
Observations 1,500 1,514
Number of Firms 200 200
R-squared 0.393 0.396
Firm FE X X
Year FE X X
Controls X X
Note: The dependent variable is displayed at the top of each column, respectively, Tax strategy
disclosure (TSD), TSD (scaled), Cash ETR, Book ETR. Treated denotes those firms that are
required according to Schedule 2019 of the Finance Act 2016 to publish a tax strategy report.
Post denotes the period after the introduction of Schedule 2019 of the Finance Act 2016 start-
ing from 2016. In all columns we control for: Size, Leverage, Age, Geographic Complexity,
Loss Firms, Market-to-Book Ratio, Standard Deviation of Sales, Analyst Following and Return
Volatility. All variables are defined in Appendix A. Standard errors are two-way clustered at
firm-year level and are reported in parentheses, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 6: Heterogeneity of the Effect of Mandatory Qualitative Tax Disclosure Regulation
- Public Attention.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sub-sample High Media Low Media B2C Non-B2C
Attention Attention
Panel A: Voluntary Tax Disclosure
Dep. Var. TSD TSD TSD TSD
Treated × Post 1.248 2.658* 3.590** 3.469
(1.439) (1.254) (1.240) (2.103)
Observations 515 429 829 219
Number of Firms 65 60 115 30
R-squared 0.828 0.768 0.820 0.811
P-Val. Test of Equ. 0.314 0.314 0.956 0.956
Pre-Reform Mean 5.876 3.658 4.866 4.630
Panel B: Tax Avoidance
Dep. Var. Cash ETR Cash ETR Cash ETR Cash ETR
Treated × Post 0.00663 -0.0504 -0.00446 -0.0277
(0.0241) (0.0884) (0.0322) (0.0255)
Observations 1,234 266 700 679
Number of Firms 165 35 88 88
R-squared 0.412 0.337 0.411 0.376
Equiv. P-Value .525 .525 .448 .448
Pre-Reform Mean 0.235 0.194 0.233 0.229
Firm FE X X X X
Year FE X X X X
Note: The dependent variable is tax strategy disclosure (TSD) (at the top of each column).
Treated denotes those firms that are required to publish a tax strategy report. Post denotes
the period after the introduction of Schedule 2019 of the Finance Act 2016 starting from 2016.
In column one (two) the sample is restricted to firms that are in B2C (non-B2C) industries.
In column three (four) the sample is restricted to firms with above (below) pre-treatment me-
dian attention. In all columns we control for: Size, Leverage, Age, Geographic Complexity,
Loss Firms, Market-to-Book Ratio, Standard Deviation of Sales, Analyst Following and Return
Volatility. All variables are defined in Appendix A. All columns report regressions with firm and
year fixed effects. Standard errors are two-way clustered at firm-year level and are reported in
parentheses, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 7: Heterogeneity of the Effect of Mandatory Qualitative Tax Disclosure Regulation on Annual Report Tax Strategy Disclosure
(TSD) - Firm Characteristics.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sub-sample Voluntary Non-Voluntary High Tax Low Tax Tax & Acc Non-Tax & Acc
Disclosing Disclosing Avoidance Avoidance Board Mem. Board Mem.
Dep. Var. TSD TSD TSD TSD TSD TSD
Treated × Post 3.632* 1.295 2.708* 3.709** 2.548* 3.994**
(1.926) (0.724) (1.219) (1.510) (1.363) (1.389)
Observations 500 492 479 569 596 452
Number of Firms 63 64 68 77 87 58
R-squared 0.781 0.577 0.800 0.827 0.821 0.799
P-Val. Test of Equ. 0.239 0.239 0.572 0.572 0.401 0.401
Firm FE X X X X X X
Year FE X X X X X X
Controls X X X X X X
Note: The dependent variable is tax strategy disclosure (TSD) (at the top of each column ), which denotes the number of sentences in the
annual report that describe the tax strategy. Treated denotes those firms that are required to publish a tax strategy report. Post denotes
the period after the introduction of Schedule 2019 of the Finance Act 2016 starting from 2016. In column one (two) the sample is restricted
to firms that have mean tax strategy sentences of pre-treatment above (below) the median of all firms pre-treatment. In column three (four)
the sample is restricted to firms that have a pre-reform mean Cash ETR above (below) the pre-reform median of all firms.In column five
(six) the sample is restricted to firms that have (do not have) at least a board member with a tax/accounting background pre-treatment.
In all columns we control for: Size, Leverage, Age, Geographic Complexity, Loss Firms, Market-to-Book Ratio, Standard Deviation of Sales,
Analyst Following and Return Volatility. All variables are defined in Appendix A. All columns report regressions with firm and year fixed
effects. Standard errors are two-way clustered at firm-year level and are reported in parentheses, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 8: Heterogeneity of the Effect of Mandatory Qualitative Tax Disclosure Regulation on Tax Avoidance - Firm Characteristics.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sub-sample Voluntary Non-Voluntary High Tax Low Tax Tax & Acc Non-Tax & Acc
Disclosing Disclosing Avoidance Avoidance Board Mem. Board Mem.
Dep. Var. Cash ETR Cash ETR Cash ETR Cash ETR Cash ETR Cash ETR
Treated × Post 0.00284 -0.00851 -0.0205 0.00742 -0.0406 0.0229
(0.0609) (0.0392) (0.0248) (0.0507) (0.0380) (0.0289)
Observations 500 568 789 711 799 701
Number of Firms 66 70 100 100 112 88
R-squared 0.463 0.326 0.390 0.318 0.410 0.380
Equiv. P-Value .968 .968 .675 .675 .169 .169
Firm FE X X X X X X
Year FE X X X X X X
Controls X X X X X X
Note: The dependent variable is Cash ETR. Treated denotes those firms that are required to publish a tax strategy report. Post denotes the
period after the introduction of Schedule 2019 of the Finance Act 2016 starting from 2016. In column one (two) the sample is restricted to
firms that have mean tax strategy sentences of pre-treatment above (below) the median of all firms pre-treatment. In column three (four)
the sample is restricted to firms that have a pre-reform mean Cash ETR above (below) the pre-reform median of all firms. In column five
(six) the sample is restricted to firms that have (do not have) at least a board member with a tax/accounting background pre-treatment.
In all columns we control for: Size, Leverage, Age, Geographic Complexity, Loss Firms, Market-to-Book Ratio, Standard Deviation of Sales,
Analyst Following and Return Volatility. All variables are defined in Appendix A. All columns report regressions with firm and year fixed
effects. Standard errors are two-way clustered at firm-year level and are reported in parentheses, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 9: The Relationship Between Quality of Tax Strategy Reports (TSR) and Increased
Annual Report Tax Strategy Disclosure (TSD) .
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. Var. TSD TSD TSD TSD
Sub-sample Long High High High
TSR TSR Specificity TSR Similarity Compliance
Treated × Post 3.614** 3.344** 3.922** 3.285**
(1.203) (1.120) (1.480) (1.141)
Observations 828 843 673 990
Number of Firms 116 117 94 136
R-squared 0.821 0.818 0.825 0.811
Sub-sample Short Low Low Low
TSR TSR Specificity TSR Similarity Compliance
Treated × Post 2.129* 2.637* 2.526** 1.847
(1.124) (1.432) (1.069) (1.173)
Observations 629 614 784 467
Number of Firms 92 91 114 72
R-squared 0.797 0.807 0.800 0.817
P-Val. Test of Equ. 0.360 0.636 0.659 0.047
Firm FE X X X X
Year FE X X X X
Controls X X X X
Note: The dependent variable is tax strategy disclosure (TSD) (at the top of each column).
Treated denotes those firms that are required to publish a tax strategy report. Post denotes the
period after the introduction of Schedule 2019 of the Finance Act 2016 starting from 2016. In
column one the sample is split by long (short) TSR, a dummy equal to one (zero) if a firm has
above (below) median number of words in its tax strategy report. In column two the sample
is split by high (low) TSR Specificity). In column three the sample is split by high (low) TSR
Similarity. In column four the sample is split by high (low) Compliance. In all columns we
control for: Size, Leverage, Age, Geographic Complexity, Loss Firms, Market-to-Book Ratio,
Standard Deviation of Sales, Analyst Following and Return Volatility. All variables are defined
in Appendix A. All columns report regressions with firm and year fixed effects. Standard errors
are two-way clustered at firm-year level and are reported in parentheses, *** p < 0.01, **
p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 10: The Relationship Between Quality of Tax Strategy Reports (TSR) and Tax
Avoidance.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. Var. Cash ETR Cash ETR Cash ETR Cash ETR
Sub-sample Long High High High
TSR TSR Specificity TSR Similarity Compliance
Treated × Post 0.0166 0.00563 0.0384 -0.00194
(0.0280) (0.0298) (0.0336) (0.0254)
Observations 1,227 1,219 1,003 1,4255
Number of Firms 165 163 138 189
R-squared 0.396 0.387 0.381 0.394
Sub-sample Short Low Low Low
TSR TSR Specificity TSR Similarity Compliance
Treated × Post -0.0604** -0.0358 -0.0435 -0.0977**
(0.0243) (0.0253) (0.0240) (0.0330)
Observations 943 951 1,167 745
Number of Firms 130 132 157 106
R-squared 0.396 0.400 0.411 0.396
Equiv. P-Value 0.015 0.550 0.001 0.057
Firm FE X X X X
Year FE X X X X
Controls X X X X
Note: The dependent variable is Cash ETR. Treated denotes those firms that are required to
publish a tax strategy report. Post denotes the period after the introduction of Schedule 2019
of the Finance Act 2016 starting from 2016. In column one, the sample is split by long (short)
TSR. In column two, the sample is split by high (low) TSR Specificity). In column three,
the sample is split by high (low) TSR Similarity. In column four the sample is split by high
(low) Compliance. In all columns we control for: Size, Leverage, Age, Geographic Complexity,
Loss Firms, Market-to-Book Ratio, Standard Deviation of Sales, Analyst Following and Return
Volatility. All variables are defined in Appendix A. All columns report regressions with firm and
year fixed effects. Standard errors are two-way clustered at firm-year level and are reported in
parentheses, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Figure 1: The Quality of the Tax Strategy Reports
(a) Similarity (b) Specificity
Note: This figure displays (a) the distribution of the maximum similarity score obtained when
comparing each tax strategy report to every other tax strategy report in our sample (b) the
distribution of the level of specificity of our sample firms’ tax strategy reports. All variables are
defined in Appendix A.
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Figure 2: The evolution of qualitative tax disclosure measure
(a) Tax Strategy Sentences (b) Non Tax Strategy Sentences
(c) Ratio of Tax Strategy Sentences to Total Sentences
Note: This figure shows the evolution over time of the average number of Tax Strategy Sentences,
Non-Tax Strategy Sentences and the Ratio of Tax Strategy to Total Sentences for control and
treated firms. Where Tax Strategy Sentences are the sentences in the annual report that describe
the tax strategy; Non-Tax Strategy Sentences correspond to the Tax Sentences in the annual
report which do not pertain to the firm’s tax strategy and Total Sentences represent the total
number of sentences in a firm’s annual report. All variables are defined in Appendix A.
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Figure 3: Dynamic Effects of the Reform on Qualitative Tax Disclosure - Event Studies.





































































Treated group Control group
(d) Book ETR
Note: The figure plots the time-trends regression coefficients (the blue diamonds and red dots),
βks, and 95 percent confidence intervals (the blue and red vertical lines) based on two-way clus-
ter robust standard errors (firm-year) from the following specification: ReformOutcomesit =∑3
k=−4 βk ∗ Dkt + BXit + γi + εit, where we run regressions seperately for treated and control
group. ReformOutcomesit is TSD (tax Strategy Disclosure) in Panel A, TSD scaled by total
sentences in the annual report in Panel B, Cash ETR in Panel C, Book ETR in Panel D. All
variables are defined in Appendix A. In Panel C and D we drop loss observations from the
sample.
∑3
k=−4 βk ∗Dkt is a series of year dummies that equal one in each of the k years before
and after the reform. We bin event dummies at endpoints of the event window, at k=4 and
show coefficients only for 3 years before the reform. BXit is a set of firm-level controls: Size,
Leverage, Age, Geographic Complexity, Loss Firms, Market-to-Book Ratio, Standard Deviation
of Sales, Analyst Following and Return Volatility. γi are the firm fixed effects. εit is the error





Tax Disclosure: The total number of tax sentences in each annual report, i.e. all sen-
tences containing the three letters “tax” written sequentially, eliminating those where the
only time the three letters “tax” appear are in: “pre-tax”, “net of tax”, “before income
tax”, “after tax”, “before tax”, “tax free”
TSD: Tax Strategy Disclosure - The number of sentences in the annual report that
describe the tax strategy
TSD (scaled): The number of tax strategy sentences in an annual report divided by the
total number of sentences in that annual report
TSD (binary): A dummy equal to one if the variable TSD is above zero
Cash ETR: The ratio of tax paid over pre-tax income, set to one if if above 1 or if
tax paid is positive and pre-tax income negative and set to zero if tax paid is negative
Book ETR: The ratio of tax expense over pre-tax income, set to one if above 1 or
if tax expense is positive and pre-tax income negative and set to zero if tax expense is
negative
Tax & Accounting Board Members : A dummy equal to one if the firm has at
least a board member with a tax/accounting background pre-treatment. Following Chy-
chyla et al. (2019) an accounting expert is a board member with at least one of the
following qualifications: has a CPA (or similar certification), or has been employed either
as an auditor, tax professional, financial controller, treasurer, or CFO.
Voluntary Disclosing: A dummy equal to one (zero) if the mean tax strategy sen-
tences of the firm pre-treatment is below (above) the median of all firms pre-treatment.
High (Low) Tax Avoidance: A dummy equal to one (zero) if the mean Cash ETR of
the firm pre-treatment is below (above) the median of all firms pre-treatment.
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B2C: A dummy equal to one if a firm is in a business-to-consumer sector defined as
in Boyd and Kannan (2018). Refer to their Web Appendix A for the 4-digits SIC codes
of non B2C firms
High (Low) Media Attention: A dummy equal to one (zero) if a firm has above
(below) median coverage computed considering the counts of distinct news events about
a firm in the last 91 days as stated in Ravenpack
Length (TSR): The total number of words in a tax strategy report
TSR Long (Short): A dummy equal to one (zero) if a firm has above (below) me-
dian number of words in its tax strategy report
High (Low) Specificity: A dummy equal to one (zero) if a firm has above (below) me-
dian specificity level expressed as the percentage of specific words over the total number of
words. Following Hope et al. (2016) specific words are defined as: entity names, including
names of persons, locations, and organizations; quantitative values in percentages; money
values; times; and dates as captured by the Stanford Named Entity Recognition (NER)
tool
High (Low) Similarity: A dummy equal to one (zero) if a firm has above (below)
similarity level of 30% (where similarity denotes the percentage of the same sequence of
words detected when comparing between two tax strategy reports computed using the
software WCopyFind)
High (Low) Compliance: A dummy equal to one (zero) if a firm post-treatment makes
(lacks) a reference to the law the tax strategy report refers to, namely Schedule 19 of the
UK Finance Act 2016.
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A.2 Control variables
Size: The natural logarithm of market value of equity
Leverage: The ratio of long-term debt over total assets
Loss: A dummy equal to one if the firm has negative profit/loss before taxes for the
majority of the selected period
Age: The natural logarithm of the number of years the firm has been listed on Datastream
Geographic Complexity: The sum of squares of each geographical segment’s sales
as a percentage of the total firm sales
Mkt to Book Ratio: The ratio of the market value of assets to the book value of
assets
Std Dev of Sales: The standard deviation of annual sales computed over the previ-
ous five years (or less than five years, if less than five previous years are available)
Analyst Following: The log of the number of analysts following the firm
Std Dev of Returns: The log of the standard deviation of returns computed over
three years
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Table A1: Test for the Difference in Means for Control and Treated Firms Pre-treatment.
Control Treated Difference in means
Variable Obs Mean Obs Mean Diff St Err t-value p-value
TSD 253 3.446 368 5.557 -2.111 0.444 -4.750 0.000
TSD (scaled) 253 0.003 368 0.004 -0.001 0.000 -2.800 0.005
Cash ETR 501 0.226 538 0.239 -0.130 0.013 -1.000 0.324
Book ETR 509 0.251 555 0.247 0.003 0.011 0.250 0.796
Board (% Tax & Acc) 484 0.212 528 0.228 -0.016 0.008 -2.050 0.042
B2C 556 0.815 603 0.858 -0.043 0.022 -1.950 0.051
Media Attention 457 4.779 485 10.254 -5.474 0.517 -10.600 0.000
Size 517 11.207 549 12.634 -1.427 0.072 -19.650 0.000
Leverage 554 0.116 601 0.157 -0.040 0.011 -3.800 0.000
Age 556 2.973 603 3.094 -0.122 0.045 -2.700 0.007
Geographic Complexity 556 0.572 603 0.596 -0.024 0.018 -1.300 0.186
Market to Book Ratio 517 1.012 549 1.427 -0.415 0.081 -5.150 0.000
Std Dev of Sales 524 9.268 575 10.284 -1.016 0.058 -17.650 0.000
Analyst Following 450 1.286 518 1.742 -0.455 0.036 -12.550 0.000
Std Dev of Returns 517 2.296 553 2.167 0.129 0.028 4.650 0.000
Note: This table reports the results of the t-test for the difference in means for our main outcome
and control variables for treated and control firms respectively over the pre-period. All variables
are defined in Appendix A.
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Table A2: Differences in Means of Pre-Reform Voluntary Tax Strategy Disclosure in
Annual Reports by Sub-Samples.
Mean Mean Diff. SE T-Val. P-Val.
(No/Low) (Yes/High)
Public Attention
B2C (No/Yes) 4.630 4.866 -0.237 1.038 -0.25 0.821
Media Attention (Low/High) 3.658 5.876 -2.218 0.897 -2.45 0.015
Firm Characteristics
Voluntary Disclosing (Low/High) 1.579 8.247 -6.669 0.684 -9.75 0.000
Tax Avoidance (Low/High) 5.371 4.151 1.22 0.838 1.45 0.147
Tax & Acc Board Mem (No/Yes) 3.933 5.55 -1.617 0.821 -1.95 0.051
TSR Report Characteristics
Long TSR (No/Yes) 4.381 6.139 -1.758 1.058 -1.65 0.102
TSR Specificity (Low/High) 5.934 4.625 1.308 1.085 1.20 0.234
TSR Similarity (Low/High) 5.144 5.966 -0.823 2.046 -0.40 0.690
Compliance (Low/High) 5.719 5.168 0.551 1.403 0.40 0.702
Note: This table shows means and differences in means of pre-reform voluntary tax strategy
disclosure in annual reports by sub-groups as named in the left most column. Observations are
collapsed at firm-level (one observation per firm) in the following way: Pre-reform voluntary tax
strategy disclosure is the firm-mean tax strategy disclosure in the years prior to the introduction
of Schedule 2019 of the Finance Act 2016, i.e., in the years until 2015. All variables are defined
in Appendix A.
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Table A3: Differences in Means of Pre-Reform Cash ETRs by Sub-Samples.
Mean Mean Diff. SE T-Val. P-Val.
(No/Low) (Yes/High)
Public Attention
B2C (No/Yes) 0.194 0.235 -0.041 0.024 -1.70 0.090
Media Attention (Low/High) 0.229 0.233 -0.004 0.022 -0.20 0.855
Firm Characteristics
Voluntary Disclosing (Low/High) 0.248 0.255 -0.006 0.026 -0.25 0.813
Tax Avoidance (Low/High) 0.311 0.148 0.163 0.018 9.25 0.000
Tax & Acc Board Mem (No/Yes) 0.256 0.206 0.050 0.020 2.45 0.015
TSR Report Characteristics
Long TSR (No/Yes) 0.240 0.222 0.019 0.037 0.50 0.615
TSR Specificity (Low/High) 0.233 0.230 0.003 0.037 0.05 0.941
TSR Similarity (Low/High) 0.230 0.245 -0.016 0.068 -0.25 0.821
Compliance (Low/High) 0.290 0.218 0.072 0.063 1.15 0.273
TSR Ref. in AR (No/Yes) 0.238 0.208 0.030 0.040 0.75 0.472
Note: This table shows means and differences in means of pre-reform Cash ETR by sub-groups
as named in the left most column. Observations are collapsed at firm-level (one observation per
firm) in the following way: Pre-reform Cash ETR is the firm-mean Cash ETR in the years prior
to the introduction of Schedule 2019 of the Finance Act 2016, i.e., in the years until 2015. All
variables are defined in Appendix A.
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Figure A1: Dynamic Effects of the Reform on Qualitative Tax Disclosure - Media Atten-
tion/ B2C Splits.
(a) High Media Attention (b) Low Media Attention
(c) B2C (d) non B2C
Note: The figure plots the time-trends regression coefficients (the blue diamonds and red dots),
βks, and 95% confidence intervals (the blue and red vertical lines) based on two-way clus-
ter robust standard errors (firm-year) from the following specification: ReformOutcomesit =∑3
k=−4 βk∗Dkt +BXit+γi+εit, where we run regressions seperately for treated and control group
and split for firms with (a) B2C firms, (b) non-B2C firms, (c) high media attention and (d) low
media attention. ReformOutcomesit is TSD. TSD is the number of sentences in the annual
report that describe the tax strategy.
∑3
k=−4 βk ∗Dkt is a series of year dummies that equal one
in each of the k years before and after the reform. We bin event dummies at endpoints of the
event window, at k=4 and show coefficients only for 3 years before the reform. BXit is a set of
firm-level controls: Size, Leverage, Age, Geographic Complexity, Loss Firms, Market-to-Book
Ratio, Standard Deviation of Sales, Analyst Following and Return Volatility. All variables are
defined in Appendix A. γi are the firm fixed effects. εit is the error term. We use year 2016,
t=0, as the base year in this fixed effects estimation.
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A.3 Näıve Bayes Classifier - Statistics and Outcomes
We select a sub-sample of 450 annual reports from firms listed in the FTSE100 for the
period 2010-2016 as our training set.We explicitly select annual reports from this group
of firms to maximize the volume of detected tax strategy sentences. Partitioning the
annual reports into sentences leads to 1,116,411 million sentences from which we exclude
all sentences not containing the three letters “tax” when appearing sequentially. This
enables us to preserve sentences containing the word “tax” as well as sentences containing
the word “taxation”. We then eliminate sentences in which the only time the three letters
“tax” appear is for the words “pre-tax”, “net of tax”, “before income tax”, “after tax”,
“before tax”, “tax free”. We end up with 41,683 tax sentences, i.e. sentences all containing
the three letters “tax”.25 Out of this set of sentences, we then manually select tax strategy
sentences and remove duplicates to obtain a final sample of 2,534 tax strategy sentences.
Next, we chose sentences in which the firm does not discuss its tax strategy, but which
have a high degree of semantic similarity to the tax strategy sentences. For this purpose,
we perform a cosine similarity analysis between all sentences in the training set, which
contain the word tax and the manually selected tax strategy sentences.26 This is a cru-
cial step to ensure that once we proceed with the machine learning approach, we can
train the algorithm on non-tax strategy sentences for which the risk of misclassification is
the highest. Our final sample is a balanced sample of 2,534 tax strategy sentences (sen-
tences discussing a firm’s approach to tax or tax governance) and 2,534 non-tax strategy
sentences (sentences not discussing a firm’s approach to tax or tax governance, but se-
mantically similar to the sentences discussing a firm’s approach to tax or tax governance).
We use the collected sample of sentences to train the näıve Bayes algorithm, which is
a supervised machine learning methodology. We use näıve Bayes to classify all sentences
in our complete sample of annual reports that contain a word “tax”.27 This approach
is a prediction model, where the input variables are the words in the document and the
predicted value is the probability of a certain category. In the context of our study,
the sentence categories are sentences containing information on a firm’s tax strategy and
sentences not containing information on a firm’s tax strategy. The conditional proba-
bilities of a word occurrence given a sentence category are learned based on the set of
manually labelled sentences on which a machine learning model is trained. Since näıve
25This enables us to minimize the risk of false positives (Type I Error), by restricting our analysis
to a subset of sentences where tax strategy sentences are most likely to appear. The drawback of our
filtering approach is the increase in the risk of false negative (or Type II Error) since we might not capture
sentences in which a firm discusses its tax strategy without explicitly using words “tax”.
26For the cosine similarity exercise, we use tf-idf (term frequency-inverse document frequency) as
weighting scheme.
27Also, for the Näıve Bayes, we use tf-idf (term frequency-inverse document frequency) as weighting
scheme.
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Bayes is machine-based, it facilitates the analysis of a large corpus and it avoids possible
biases induced by the researcher’s subjectivity.28 Overall, näıve Bayes represents a fairly
straightforward approach, which delivers consistently good classification accuracy, and
thus it is the single most used classifier in the finance and accounting literature (El-Haj
et al. (2019)).
Our complete sample is made of 9,742,293 sentences of which 279,853 contain the three
letters “tax” when written sequentially after excluding those sentences in which the only
time the three letters “tax” appear is for words “pre-tax”, “net of tax”, “before income
tax”, “after tax”, “before tax”, “tax free”. We classify them into 10,946 tax strategy
sentences and 268,907 non-tax strategy sentences using the trained näıve Bayes classifier.
Our näıve Bayes approach achieves classification accuracy of 91 percent in the in-sample
validation test, which is line with the related literature (Huang et al. (2014)).29
Below, we present the key statistics on the performance of our näıve Bayes classifier
based on the average of 50 Naive Bayes models (iterations).
We, first, present the result of the confusion matrix, which is build using our training
set (Tables A9 and A10). These tables show how many sentences are predicted to be
tax strategy sentences and are actually tax strategy sentences and the same for non-tax
strategy sentences. False stands for non-tax strategy sentences and true stands for tax
strategy sentences. Precision indicates the fraction of true tax strategy sentences over the
total number of sentences classified as tax strategy sentences (that is the sum of true tax
strategy sentences and false tax strategy sentences). Thus, precision stands for the ability
of our classifier to avoid classifying a sentence as a tax strategy sentence when in reality it
is a non-tax strategy sentence. Recall indicates the fraction of true tax strategy sentences
over the total number of correctly classified sentences (that is the sum of true tax strategy
sentences and false non-tax strategy sentences). Thus, recall stands for the ability of our
classifier to find all true tax strategy sentences. F1-score is the average between precision
and recall. Support are the total number of considered sentences. Our accuracy score is
91.56 per cent which is the average between the F1-score of the tax strategy sentences
and non-tax strategy sentences.
Table A4: Confusion Matrix
actual \predicted FALSE TRUE
FALSE 426.28 24.62
TRUE 47 351.1
28For the formal derivation of Näıve Bayes, see Antweiler and Frank (2004).
29In Appendix A.3, we show all statistics of our näıve Bayes classifier on our training sample. We
also show the performance of using alternative supervised machine learning classifier, namely SVM and
Random Forest.
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Table A5: Naive Bayes (10 iteration for each model)
Model Class Precision Recall F1-score Support
4009*2 FALSE 0.9 0.95 0.92 450.9
TRUE 0.93 0.88 0.91 398.1
We also compared the accuracy of our model to the one we would obtain using alterna-
tive approaches. We test the accuracy we would obtain using two alternative supervised
machine learning classifiers, which are also used in the finance and accounting literature.
Using SVM or the random forest, we achieve similar accuracy level as with näıve Bayes,
but slightly lower in case of SVM (90%).
Second, we offers a representative set of examples of sentences capture under the
category ”Tax Strategy Sentences” versus the one capture under the category ”Non-Tax
Strategy Sentences”.
Example of Tax Strategy Sentences:
• tax planning is always aligned with our commercial and economic activity.
• taxation: the audit committee reviewed the group tax risk policy which sets out
compliance with relevant jurisdictional legislation, identifying areas of tax risk for
appropriate focus and managing the overall group tax risk.
• where appropriate, the group enters into consultation with tax authorities to help
shape proposed legislation and future tax policy.
• we also used our own tax specialists to critically assess the appropriateness of the
future tax planning strategies.
• our board continues to work toward being assessed as ’low risk’ by hmrc and ensures
that the group adheres to the revised tax policy adopted in 2014 of not undertaking
tax planning or making use of tax havens.
• an open dialogue is maintained with HMRC involving regular meetings to review
tax issues and brief them on business issues.
• the group takes a responsible approach to the management and control of its tax
affairs and is cooperative in its dealings with the tax authorities.
• our principal activities are uk-based and we have regular meetings with hm revenue
and customs to discuss tax matters and business developments.
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• we will pay the right and fair amount of tax in each territory we trade from in
accordance with the letter and spirit of local laws and regimes.
• the board is regularly updated on tax matters, and any tax implications of commer-
cial activities are highlighted to the board with the use of a risk matrix to assess
the appropriateness of a proposal.
Example of Non-Tax Strategy Sentences:
• these shares may be withdrawn at any point during years four and five, but income
tax and national insurance would then be payable on any amounts withdrawn.
• deferred income tax assets and liabilities are offset when there is a legally enforceable
right to offset current tax assets against current tax liabilities and when the deferred
income taxes and liabilities relate to income taxes levied by the same taxation
authority on either the taxable entity or different taxable entities when there is an
intention to settle the balance on a net basis.
• these discount rates are derived from the group’s post-tax weighted average cost of
capital as adjusted for the specific risks relating to each geographical region.
• retail sales and delivery receipts are recorded net of returns, relevant vouchers, and
value added tax and recognised upon dispatch from the warehouse at which point
title and risk passes to the customer.
• the group provides for potential tax liabilities that may arise on the basis of the
amounts expected to be paid to the tax authorities.
• the carrying amount of deferred tax assets is reviewed at each statement of financial
position date and reduced to the extent that it is no longer probable that sufficient
taxable income will be available to allow all or part of the asset to be recovered.
• this revenue growth reflected the strength of tax and accounting’s product offerings
and demand in the global tax and accounting market.
• the discount rates used reflect the post-tax yields to maturity that can be obtained
on government bonds with similar maturity dates and currencies to those of the
deferred tax assets or liabilities.
• there is no time restriction over the utilisation of tax losses.
• impairment of assets the carrying amounts of the group’s non-financial assets, other
than inventories (see accounting policy ’inventories’) and deferred tax balances (see
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accounting policy ’deferred taxation’), are reviewed at each balance sheet date to
determine whether there is an indication of impairment.
Overall, since some tax strategy sentences can be hard to identify clearly, we construct
a rather conservative measure of tax strategy disclosure in annual reports to avoid false
positives. Precisely our measure is conservative in the following sense: we do not count
sentences as tax strategy sentences as soon as the classified probability of being a tax
strategy sentences vs.a non-tax strategy sentences lies just above 50%, instead we chose
a cut-off value of 99%, in order to avoid false positives.
A.4 Examples of tax strategy reports
In this section, we provide an examples of tax strategy reports from our sample of treated
firms.
First, we provide two examples of tax strategy report with very different length. On
one side RPS, a UK MNE offering professional services, offers one page long tax strategy
report, and on the other side, Jupiter, a UK fund management group, presents a 11 page
long tax strategy report.
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Table A6: Tax Strategy Report - RPS
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Table A7: Tax Strategy Report - Jupiter
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Next we offer an example of a disclosure with high degree of specificity, namely the one
of Macfarlane, a UK packaging and label MNE, which scored 19 per cent on our specificity
index. The specificity score captures how often the text refers to specific people, places,
organizations, times, or numbers. We extracted parts of the whole tax strategy report,
where the firm discuss times, places and tax-related roles.
Table A8: Tax Strategy Report - Macfarlane
Finally we provide a comparison of two tax strategy reports using WCopyFind. This
software works best using txt files, this is why we convert all tax strategy reports into txt
format. Additionally, under WCopyFind, several parameters, which delineate a text string
match, can be adjusted. In choosing the parameters, we follow the guidelines provided
by the developer of the tool. Below the comparison of the tax strategy report from
Croda International, a UK MNE active in the chemistry industry, and Carpetright, a UK
retailers of floor coverings and beds. When the same word appears in both document, it is
highlighted in red. The detected level of similarity across these two report is 63 percent.
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Table A9: Tax Strategy Report - Carpetright
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Table A10: Tax Strategy Report - Croda
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